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CHAPTER 28 
Insurance 
J. MARSHALL LEYDON 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§28.I. Policy construction: Due proof. Wording of insurance con-
tracts is extremely important since courts interpret policies as liberally 
as possible, resolving all ambiguities in favor of the insured.1 In some 
cases the final result seems to be almost completely opposite to the 
initial intent of both the insurer and the insured. A very great need 
for definition exists in the field of insurance law. During this SURVEY 
year the Supreme Judicial Court rendered two opinions that further 
clarify the phrase "due proof." 
Manzi v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance CO.2 was an action for 
disability recovery. The insurance policy required that due proof be 
rendered to the company in writing not later than one year after the 
policy anniversary date nearest the insured's sixtieth birthday; the 
insured must have become totally disabled as a result of bodily injury 
or disease prior to this date, and the disability must continue for at 
least four months. The defendant contended that the plaintiff did not 
file seasonable written proof. The plaintiff furnished three written 
proofs of claim, the third of which was not within the specified one-
year period after the anniversary date. The Court held the three 
proofs together set forth a clear picture of the plaintiff's loss. The 
discrepancy among the three proofs of loss arose because final deter-
mination could not be had until all symptoms were available and the 
discrepancy showed only a progression in available evidence. 
Krantz v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CO.3 was a contract 
action to recover double indemnity for loss of life. To recover, the 
plaintiff had to show that the death of the insured was a result of 
bodily injury caused solely by external, violent and accidental means 
and was not caused by self·destruction. The trial judge ruled that 
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§28.I. 113 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §7401 (1943). 
2335 Mass. 71, 138 N.E.2d 581 (1956). 
31957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 557, 141 N.E.2d 719. For comment on evidence aspects of 
this case, see §33.3 infra. 
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the proof submitted was insufficient and ordered judgment for the de-
fendant. The plaintiff submitted in her proof of loss several official 
records, including the record of death, the medical examiner's report, 
and the autopsy report. Each form listed suicide as the cause of death. 
The plaintiff blacked out these statements as well as those in the 
body of the proof of loss form that the plaintiff would be bound by 
all declarations contained in the documents. The Court held that the 
proof of loss form submitted to the plaintiff by the defendant implied 
that the various official documents were required as a part of the 
proof of loss and that binding the plaintiff to the opinions of suicide 
contained therein would completely deny a cause of action. It was a 
jury question as to whether a reasonable man would interpret the facts 
as shown in the proof of loss to be accidental death or death by suicide. 
That the plaintiff had stricken out various sections of the official docu-
ment did no more than would have resulted had the entire document 
been submitted as evidence since opinions were not admissible. 
The Court in the Krantz case cited the statement in the Manzi case 
that a purpose of the requirement to furnish due proof is to enable 
the defendant "to form an intelligent estimate as to whether the death 
came within the .terms of the policy." 4 Both cases cited the discussion 
of due proof in Howe v. National Life Insurance CO.5 which stated 
that in the absence of some provision designating its form, due proof 
may be submitted in any appropriate form and, if furnished by one 
or more documents, they may be construed separately or collectively 
in determining whether the information required has been given. The 
Howe case represents the general rule as to due proof in this Common-
wealth.6 
§28.2. Policy construction: Conditions. The headache of policy 
construction was again at issue in Paratore v. John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance CO.l wherein the problem was whether policies were 
void or voidable, or more particularly whether the condition was prece-
dent or subsequent. The plaintiff was suing to recover under a life 
insurance policy. The policy contained a typical clause stating that 
the policy was "voidable" if the insured had heart disease or if during 
the two years preceding the policy date he had been treated for 
serious disease.2 The plaintiff had been treated for hypertension prior 
to the policy date and had a previous five-year history of the disease. 
In holding that the company properly denied coverage the Court, 
41957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 560, 141 N.E.2d at 723. 
Ii 321 Mass. 283, 72 N.E.2d 425 (1947). 
6 Cooper v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 329 Mass. 301, 107 N.E.2d 
805 (1952); Howard v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 326 Mass. 722, 96 N.E.2d 
708 (1951). See 'also Annotation, 170 A.L.R. 1254 (1947); Twenty-eighth Report, 
Judicial Council of Massachusetts for 1952, 37 Mass. L.Q. No.4, p. 31 (1952); Note, 
27 B.U.L. Rev. 497 (1947). 
§28.2. 1335 Mass. 632, 141 N.E.2d 511 (1957). 
2 The entire clause is quoted in 335 Mass. at 634, 141 N.E.2d at 512. 
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however, took a rather troublesome line of argument. The tenor of 
the opinion suggests that the Court considered that the policy was 
void and not voidable and that absence of disease was a condition 
precedent to the policy taking effect. The policy clause, however, 
specifically makes the policy voidable, which would make the clause a 
condition subsequent. The result of this case, of course, would be 
the same under either theory. 
§28.3. Limitation of right of action. Employers Mutual Life In-
surance Co. of Wisconsin v. Ford Motor CO.1 held that the plaintiff 
insurer lost its right of action because it did not bring suit within the 
nine-month period prescribed for third-party suits by the carrier in 
workmen's compensation cases. The case is fully discussed elsewhere 
in the SURVEy.2 
§28.4. Compulsory motor vehicle insurance rates. Massachusetts 
law empowers the Commissioner of Insurance to set the compulsory 
automobile insurance rates.1 He may call for such data, statistics, 
schedules or information from the companies as he deems necessary. 
In determining the rates for the year 1957, the Commissioner took 
the rates in effect for 1956 and made adjustments for repeal of the 
demerit surcharge provisions of the Highway Safety Act.2 The Com-
missioner relied upon the efforts being made to speed up the court 
docket by means of the auditor system on the theory that the delay 
in obtaining a jury trial is caused mainly by automobile tort cases and 
a speeding up would result in a substantial saving to the insurers. The 
Court overruled the Commissioner's rates in A merican Employers' 
Insurance Co. v. The Commissioner of Insurance.S Of the Commis-
sioner's claim that early trial of cases would result in a saving to the 
insurers the Court said, "This is a mere conclusion reached by the 
respondent and is unsupported by any evidence." 4 The Court or-
dered the Commissioner to fix the 1957 rate on the evidence previously 
submitted by the companies. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§28.5. New insurance. The General Court during the SURVEY 
year enacted several statutes opening up new areas of insurance cover-
age to the industry. Acts of 1957, c. 453 authorizes insurers engaged in 
casualty underwriting to write policies insuring against legal liability 
or loss or damage caused by nuclear energy hazards. It sets forth the 
various combinations of insurance that are permissible, the means of 
§28.3. 1335 Mass. 504, 140 N.E.2d 634 (1957). 
2 See §30.1 infra. 
§28.4. 1 G.L., c. 175, §1l3B, added by Acts of 1925, c. 346, §4. 
2 Id., c. 90A, added by Acts of 1953, c. 570, §1. 
81957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605, 142 N.E.2d 341. 
4 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 610, 142 N.E.2d at 345. 
3
Leydon: Chapter 28: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1957
§28.8 INSURANCE IY9 
notification of loss, the surplus required prior to writing such insurance, 
and other conditions. The importance of this legislation is readily ap-
parent. The National Chamber of Commerce has for some time been 
endorsing this type of insurance as a means of enhancing the economy 
of the various states by encouraging, through insurance protection, 
peacetime use of atomic power. Massachusetts is one of the last links 
in the chain of jurisdictions authorizing this type of insurance. 
Acts of 1957, c. 115 is one of the more important of these new insur-
ance enactments. It permits certain handicapped children of subscribers 
to medical service plans to be eligible under the membership of the 
parent, notwithstanding that such children are over nineteen years 
old. These children will thus continue to be covered under blanket 
family policies regardless of age. 
Acts of 1957, c. 177 modifies C.L., c. 175, § 94B by authorizing the 
writing of burglary, livestock and reinsurance as additions to the 
types of coverage reciprocal insurance exchanges may write. 
Acts of 1957, c. 242 provides that cities and towns may purchase 
contributory group life insurance for their employees and prescribes 
the procedure to be followed. Croup life, almost universal in private 
industry, is now available to municipalities. 
§28.6. Motor vehicle insurance. Acts of 1957, c. 194 sets up pro-
visions for non-criminal fines and punishments to be imposed on 
juvenile offenders of the motor vehicle laws. It provides that the 
adjudication and disposition of these matters are to be admissible 
as evidence in any proceeding for cancellation of motor vehicle in-
surance policies covering the vehicle. 
§28.7. Investments and assets. Acts of 1957, c. 183 provides for 
investment by certain insurance companies in mortgages or leasehold 
estates, thus providing a new avenue of investment for these insurance 
companies. Acts of 1957, c. 152 corrects accounting practice to exclude 
all land costs from book value in computing the rate at which invest-
ments by life insurance companies in real property shall be written 
down. 
§ 28.8. Miscellaneous provisions. Acts of 1957, c. 541 exempts 
foreign insurance companies from taxation. The most striking feature 
of this enactment is its retaliatory nature; Massachusetts will grant 
this exemption only if the state of the principal office of the foreign 
corporation grants a similar exception to corporations organized under 
Massachusetts law. 
Acts of 1957, c. 161 provides that an insurance agent's wife will be 
allowed to continue the work of her deceased husband so long as she 
is under the direct supervision of a licensed agent or broker. This 
is similar to statutes in other jurisdictions although they do not always 
require supervision. 
Acts of 1957, c. 633 provides indemnity, similar to compulsory limits, 
on all state vehicles being operated by employees within the course 
of their employment. This closes another of the gaps in the com-
pulsory motor vehicle coverage. 
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